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ADMIRALTY-COLLISION

AT SEA-RECOVERY

BY

OWNER OF

CaRo.-In a

recent English decision in the House of Lords it was held that, where there
has been a collision between two ships in such circumstances that both vessels
are to be deemed in fault, and cargo on one of the ships has been damaged
by the collision, the owners of the cargo so damaged, being in no way identified with the owners of the carrying ship, can recover only one-half their
damages from the owners of the other ship. Owners of Cargo of Steamship
"Tongariro," v. Astral Shipping Company, 103 Law Times, 773 (Eng., igio).
See to same effect "The Drumlanrig," 79 L. J. P. ioo (i9io).
The judges in coming to 'this conclusion express their dissatisfaction
with the result, but feel bound to follow the law as established earlier in the
Court of Admiralty, because of section 25, sub-section 9 of the Judicature
Act of 1873, which provides that: "In any cause or proceeding for damages
arising out of collision between two ships, if both ships should be found
to have been in fault, the rules hitherto in force in the Court of Admiralty,
so far as they have been at variance with the rules in force in the courts
of common law, shall prevail." This law is that the owner of the cargo
could recover only one-half his loss from the other ship. The "Milan," 5
L. T. Rep. 59o. In a case decided in the House of Lords in 1888, it was
held that, where a collision was due to the fault of both ships, and two innocent persons on one of the vessels were killed as a result, their representatives
could recover the whole of the damages from the other ship, the Admiralty
rule as to half damages not being applicable to actions under Lord Campbell's
Act. The "Bernina," L. R. 13 App. C. I. This view as to damages is that
preferred by the court in the present case for all actions.
The doctrine of the principal case is not followed in the United States,
where it is generally held that the owner of the cargo, damaged by a collision due to the fault of both vessels, may recover the full amount of his
damages from the other vessel, or the carrying vessel. The "St. Lawrence,"
i9 Fed. 328; The "Troy," 28 Fed. 86z; The "Britannic," 39 Fed. 395; The
"Atlas," 93 U. S. 302; The "Franconia," 16 Fed. Rep. 149. It has been held
in Arkansas that the owner of goods injured in a collision must share the
fate of the vessel on which the goods were shipped, and cannot recover,
unless it is proved that her owners would be entitled to recover. Duggins
v. Watson, et al., 15 Ark. 18. This is clearly contra to the general maritime
law, where contributory negligence, even if it could be imputed to one who
had shipped goods on the boat in question, (which it cannot), does not bar
a recovery; for where both ships are in fault, the law, as between the two
ships, apportions the loss by obliging the wrongdoer to pay half the loss
of the other. Marsden, Collisions at Sea (6th ed.), p. 123; Hay v. Le Neve,
2 Shaw, Sc. App. 395. The American and English decisions are in accord,
Oil this point, holding that where both vessels are at fault damages should be
apportioned. The "Gray Eagle," 9 Wall, 55o; The "America," 92 U. S. 432;
The "Pennsylvania," i9 Wall, 125.
CHEcxs-HoLDER IN DuE CouRs-AGENcY.-In Bowles Co. v. Fraser,
et al., iog Pac. 812 (i9io) Wash., the defendant Clark was engaged in the
construction of a house in which the defendant Fraser was to supply the
plumbing. After partially performing his contract, Fraser informed Clark
that to complete the work he needed money for the purchase of materials,
which could be procured from the plaintiff. Clark thereupon drew a check
to the order of the plaintiff and gave it to Fraser. Fraser, upon transferring
the check to the plaintiff, instead of using it entirely for the purchase of
materials, used part of it to pay an old debt, secured part as an advance in
cash and applied the remainder to his general account. In an action on
the check, the court held that the payees were obliged to account to the
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drawer for the check or for its proceeds, and when they appropriated it to
Fraser's use, they did not so account. Although the plaintiff had the right
to assume that Fraser's powers were such as the circumstances surrounding
the transaction made them appear to be, these circumstances were not of
such a nature as to warrant the belief that the property in the check was the
property of Fraser. A person dealing with an agent must use reasonable
diligence to ascertain whether the agent acts within the scope of his powers.
Recovery was denied.
This unusual case may be viewed from several standpoints. Had Fraser
gone to the payee with the check blank as to the payee's name and had in
his presence filled it up, the liability of the drawer would have been unquestioned at common law. Russel v. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 514 (178O); Powell v.
Duff, 3 Camp. x81(1812); Jones v. Shelbyville Ins. Co., i Metc. (Ky.) 58,
(858) ; Rich v. Strabuck, 51 Ind. 87 (1875). This has been directly overruled
bythe Negotiable Instruments Law, however, which has been supported in
the cases where the question has arisen. Guerrant v. Guerrant, 7 Va. L. R.
639 (io2); Boston Steel & Iron Co. v. Sterner, 183 Mass. i4o (1903). But
this section of the act has no application to completed instruments and the
law merchant should therefore govern, as provided by the act. Although
this is not an incomplete instrument, the principles seem so analogous that
the principles of the law merchant in respect to incomplete instruments
should apply. This would allow recovery.
Furthermore, negligence in the taker will not constitute notice of an
infirmity in the paper, and even gross negligence, although it may be evidence
tending to show mala fides, is not mala fides. Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall, iio
(1864); Davis v. Seeley, 71 Mich. 210 (1888). This principle has remained
unchanged under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
One element necessary to constitute the taker of an instrument a holder
in due course as laid down by Daniel, Vol. i, p. 780, 4th ed., is that he
must have acquired the paper in the ordinary and usual course of business.
Clearly the transaction was not of a common sort, but whether or not it
was of such an unusual nature as to constitute a holder not in due course
seems questionable. Would allowing recovery in order to give more freedom
of circulation to negotiable paper be justified, or is the situation here presented that of drawer and payee who are strangers to each other, such an
unusual one that to allow recovery would not be an impetus to freedom of
circulation?
The question really resolves itself into this: "Are the drawer and payee
of a check in privity?" For if .not, the decision cannot be supported. The
cases which have raised this point are comparatively limited in number, but
there seems to be an unanimity of opinion that mere proximity will not make
privity. Nickerson v. Howard, ig Johns. 113 (182r); Horn v. Fuller, 6 N.
H. 5 (x834); Peterborough & Shirley R. R. v. Chamberlin, 44 N. H. 494
(863); Munroe v. Bordier, 8 Manning, Granger & Scott, 86i (1849) ; South
Boston Iron Co. v. Brown, 63 Me. 149 (1873). Is there any valid reason
why a creditor should not accept as payment from his debtor the latter's
check payable to a third person, to whom the creditor is indebted, and should
the third person take the check at his risk? Is the fact that the parties to
an instrument are strangers to each other an unusual state of affairs in business transactions; e. g., foreign draft?
Another error into which the court seems to have fallen is that of regarding Fraser purely in the light of an agent. Part of the work was completed
and part of the check may 'well be taken to have been given in payment for
the work already done. He was really an independent party. For a contrary
viewpoint on almost exact facts, see South Boston Iron Co. v. Brown, supra.
Altogether, the case seems to have been decided upon a cursory view of
authorities, and is not substantiated by the principles of the law merchant.
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY-PART

PERFORMANCE

ON

SUNDAY-A

Missouri

statute provides that every person who shall labor, or compel or permit any
person in his charge to labor, on Sunday, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Under this statute, it was held in Knapp and Co. v. Culbertson, et a., i33 S.
W. Rep. 55 (igio), that a contract stipulating for the insertion of advertisements in all the editions of a Sunday newspaper, was void, it being
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him. In re Huggonson, 2 Atkyns, 469. This proposition has never since
been doubted, and the power which it gives the courts has been frequently
exercised both in England and America. The only doubt that could arise
as to the authority of American courts to punish for contempt in such case,
would have its foundation in constitutional provisions in some of the States.
But it has been held" that the status of contempts as to pending causes is
not affected by a constitutional provision guaranteeing to every person freedom to speak or publish whatever he will, nor by provisions requiring prosecutions of offenses by indictment or information, and providing that no
warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation
reduced to writing. People v. News-Times Pub. Co., 35 CoIo. 253 (19o6).
Nor is trial by jury essential to "due process" in contempt proceedings.
Eilenbecker v. Plymouth Co., x34 U. S. 31 (i889).
The right to punish for contempt in cases like Rex v. Clarke, .upra,
being clear, the question arises whether the publication by the defendant
was, in fact, contemptuous? The English court, as well as counsel for the
defendant, took it for granted that the statement that the accused had confessed, whether true or untrue, tended to prejudice his right to a fair and
impartial trial, and was, therefore, a contempt of court. It is doubtful whether
in most American jurisdictions the statement in question would have been
so freely conceded to be contemptuous. However, it has been decided that
the publication of statements of facts, evidence of which would not have
been competent at the trial of the cause, and which would likely be read
by the judge and jury sitting on the trial, and would have a tendency to
influence the determination of the cause, is a contempt. Telegram Newspaper
Co. v. Commonwealth, z72 Mass. 294 (1899). So, also, the publication of a
discussion of a portion of the Government's evidence supposed to have been
prepared for trial. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, i88 Mass. 44.9
(9o5). If the court assumes to punish as contempts, publications which
tend to prevent the fair and impartial administration of justice, it is submitted that it can spend its energy to no better advantage than to end the
American practice of publishing the very type of sensational statement concerning persons accused of capital offenses which came before the court in
Rex v. Clarke.
The only question which troubled the English court was whether the
statements were published during a pending cause, since the prisoner had
not- yet been charged with the crime in a magistrate's court. In Rex v.
Clarke, 19o3 L. R. 2 K. B. Div. 432, the court decided that a cause was pending
when the accused was arraigned in the magistrate's court, even though he
had not yet been committed. This decision went on the ground that the
Judicature Act of 1873 made the inferior courts of record branches of the
Court of King's Bench; and that since the higher court was empowered to
prevent the inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction, it could also
protect them from contempts in cases where they did not themselves have
the necessary power. That being so, it was only necessary for the court
in the recent case to decide that issuing a warrant is a judicial act in order
to hold the defendant; and they readily reached this conclision.
In the United States, magistrates' courts are not courts of record, nor can
they be considered branches of the superior courts in such a sense as to
give the higher courts jurisdiction to protect them from contempt. In Globe
Newspaper Company v. Commonwealth, supra, the court held that the publisher of an objectionable statement may be in contempt, although at the
time of publication the trial was not in progress nor immediately to take
place, if an indictment had been found against the accused. This is as far
as the courts of this country can go.
The desirability of such a power as is lodged in the Court of King's
Bench to punish anything which tends to prejudice a fair trial, is obvious
It has been suggested by Mr. Untermeyer, of the New York bar, that a
similar protection might be given trials in this country by enacting statutes
making publications of the kind in question at any time after the issuing
of the warrant, misdemeanors. It may be doubted, however, whether such
legislation would be enforceable in practice; and if enforceable, whether it
would be enforced.
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CRIMINAL LAw-WHo Ann PRINCrPALS.-IrI the case of Buchanan v.
State, 112 Pac. 32 (Old., igo), it was held that those who in any way
take part in the commission of a crime are principals, regardless of whether
they have any interest in or receive any reward for its commission. The
case in question was an illegal sale of intoxicating liquor, the evidence tending to prove that the defendant voluntarily procured whiskey for a friend
by purchasing it, and was, in reality, a mere go-between. He had, however,
received money and given whiskey in return, so that he became, prima facie,
guilty of a sale without a license. His defence was that he was merely the
messenger and agent of the seller and in no way that of the buyer.
Upon this point, whether the voluntary agent of a purchaser of liquor is
a principal, the courts stand evenly divided. The above case proceeded on
the ground that the statute provided that all who were concerned in the commission of a crime, aiding and abetting, should be principals. This provision
must be construed broadly, for otherwise the excuse of "I was only a gobetween," might be pleaded in every criminal case of the sort. It is no
argument in answer to this to say that the jury could decide that such a
defence was a mere subterfuge, for the burden of proof would be on the
State and evidence of this sort is often extremely difcilt to obtain. Moreover, every sale requires a seller as well as a purchaser, so that the gobetween is as much the agent of one as the other, especially as the act of
delivery is his and his only. The cases in line with this decision are: Wortham v. State, 8o Miss. 212, 192o; Foster v. State, 45 Ark. 364, 1885. See
also Clark, Crim. Law, § 53, and cases cited. The case of Foster v. State
(supra), is extreme in that the sale was to a minor, and by statute minors
were not responsible criminally for procuring the sale of liquor to themselves. It is of interest to note that the court in the case under discussion
reversed a decison of its own made only a year previous in Reed v. State,

103 Pac. 1o7O (Okl., 1909).

Upon the other side of the question the argument is that a man who
takes money from another and with it purchases liquor from a third-if he
is not interested in the sale and receives no part of the money-is not guilty
of selling, and this is the only offence covered by the statute. There is no
law that prohibits the purchase of liquor for oneself or another. Anderson
v. State, 32 Fla. 242, 1893; Maxwell v. State, 14o Ala. 131, 1904. The last
case may be compared to Foster v. State (supra), as there also the purchase was by agent of a minor.
The weight of authority, if any, is upon. the side of the latter cases.
However, it is probable that the view taken in the present case is preferable
for the reasons of policy given. In almost all cases of this sort the real
intent is to obtain liquor illegally, e. g., on Sunday or in "dry" towns. If
there is any reason for enacting statutory regulations of this sort, the same
reason requires an extension of their application to all persons who violate
their spirit, provided at the same time that no legal principle is contraverted.
It does not seem that such a decision is contrary to the rules regarding
principals, for as the "go-between" commits the act himself, he is either a
principal in the fullest sense of the word, or else he has no connection with
the crime whatever. Therefore, there seems to be reason for following
Buchanan v. State (supra), whereas the argument against it is confined to
the strict interpretation of the technical term "sale."
EVIDENcE-PREsuMPTION

AS

To

Fol IGN LAW.-In

Parott v. Mexico

Cent. Ry. Co., 93 N. E_ 59o (Mass., 1911), the plaintiff brought an action
on an oral executory contract made under the laws of Mexico. There was
no evidence of what was the law of Mexico, but the court allowed the
plaintiff to recover. Held: The presumption that the law of a foreign
jurisdiction is, in the absence of evidence, the law of the forum, does not
apply in all cases. Where the foreign jurisdiction is known to have the
common law, it may be presumed to regard it in all its details, but where a
different system of law exists it will only extend to the broadest principles
of legal right and wrong, common to all civilized countries.
The decision seems sound and well within the most conservative rules
in regard to presumptions of the law of foreign countries. The court is
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careful not to adopt the rule that in all cases the law of a foreign country
is to be presumed to be that of the forum, and in so limiting the application
of the presumption would seem to disagree with the doctrine of several
earlier Massachusetts cases. Thus in Harvey v. Merrill, i5o Mass. I (i889),
where the question arose as to the law of Illinois, Field, J., said: "The rights
of the parties are to be determined by the law of Illinois, but there is
no evidence that the common law of Illinois differs from that of Massachusetts. * * * We are, therefore, to determine whether the contract is
illegal and void by the common law of Massachusetts." Of like effect are
the words of Knowlton, C. J., in Mittenthal v. Mascagni, x83 Mass. ig
(i9o3): "Assuming this (that the case was to be considered upon the
declaration and admitted facts only), we must also assume that the law of
Italy is like our own"; and also in Bayer v. Lovelace, 204 Mass. 327 (910) ;
"We are not informed as to what the law of Colombia is, in reference to
such conditions as appear in this case, but there is no reason to think that
it is different from that of this country." This rule, that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the law of a foreign country is presumed to be
the law of the forum, is adopted by the courts of New York: Haynes v. McDermott, 82 N. Y. 41 (i88o); New Jersey: Teake v. Bergen, 27 N. J. Eq.
36o (1876), and Minnesota: Desnoyer v. McDonald, 4 Minn, 315 '(I86o),
and is the law in Pennsylvania: Bollinger v. Gallagher, 144 Pa. 2o5 (i89i).
Those who adopt the conservative rule expressed in the principal case
look at the presumption as purely a rule of evidence founded on the probative value of facts within the knowledge of the court. See Mr. Bigelow's
note, Story on Conflict of Laws, § 637. It is submitted that the rule is
not so much a rule of evidence as a rule of procedure, founded not on any
question of probability, but on consideration of expediency and procedural
justice. It would seem fair that the party wishing to enforce a right or
avoid a liability under a foreign law should be required to introduce evidence of that law in cases where it is -different from that of the forum.
This view is well expressed by Mr. Justice Williams in Bollinger v. Gallagher, 144 Pa. 2o5 (891): "The laws of an existug State are not taken
judicial notice of by the courts of this State, and for that reason they will
be assumed to be the same as our own unless shown by competent evidence
to be different."
The principal case was well within both rules and did not require a
general review and statement of the law, but this having been done, the
court has definitely placed Massachusetts among those States which treat
the rule as purely one of evidence justified by the probative value of the facts
which give rise to it.
FiXTUREs-LWE TENANT AND REMAINDERMA.-A testator devised a life
interest in an ancient mansion, which contained valuable wood carvings
attached to the interior walls, to his son with remainder over. The son
removed and sold one carving. It was held in a suit brought by the remainderman that the carvings were fixtures, part of the building itself, and that
the proceeds of- the sale were subject to the settlement. Lord Chesterfield's
Estates, 13 Law Times, 823 (Eng., Igio).
The question whether a chattel which has been annexed to real estate
thereby loses its character as personalty and becomes a part of the realty,
is so confused that even the proper definition of the term "fixture". is in
doubt. A fixture has been defined as a chattel so affixed as to be an inseparable part of the realty, Co. Lit. 53, A 4; as a chattel annexed to real
estate, but which is removable. Bouvier's Law Dict.; and lastly, as a chattel
associated with land concerning which the question most often arising is
its removability, Brown on Law of Fixtures (4th ed.), pp. 1-3. In reading
the great majority of opinions and text-books, the context must be carefully examined to determine the meaning of the term "fixture" wherever
it occurs. The English judges observing that it is a solecism-a contradiction in words-to speak of a "removable fixture," use the term in its original
sense.
Viewed as a whole, the cases concerning fixtures are conflicting, but
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taken chronologically they consistently show a gradual relaxation of the
early rule, quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit. By degrees the courts have
adopted less rigid rules, until now the recognized criterion of a fixture is
whether the party who annexed the chattel intended thereby to make a
permanent accession to the freehold. Teaff v. Kewitt, 10 Ohio St. 511 (1853).
But this intent is not the secret, unrevealed intention of the party, but the
intent fairly deducible from all the circumstances. Bank v. North, i6o Pa.
Various factors must be considered in determining the intent.
303 (894).
The relation of the parties interested is important, landlord and tenant, heirs
and personal representatives, co-tenants, mortgagor and mortgagee, and so
on. The nature and manner in which the chattel is annexed.
Where the permanent owner associates chattels with realty, the ostensible
purpose of the annexation is a useful criterion. So where statuary has
been so placed as to evidently form part of a complete architectural plan,
it is a fixture. D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, L. R. 3 Eq. 382 (1866); but where
similar, articles have been set up for mere ornament, they remain chattels.
Pfluger v. Carmichael, 54 App. Div. 153 (N. Y., x9oo). Where the life
tenant stretched tapestry upon the walls of a magnificent room, his executor
was allowed to remove them. In re Falbe (ipoi), i Ch. 523; but where, as
in the principal case, the life tenant received the ancient house with the
tapesfries already in place, they were held to be fixtures. Norton v. Dashwood (1896), 2 Ch. 497. There is no arbitrary rule by which it may be
determined whether or not a particular chattel annexed to real estate is
a chattel. The question is psually one for the jury. Hook v. Bolton, 199
Mass 244 (19o8); Silliman v. Whitmer, 196 Pa. 363 (19oo).
INSURANcE-DoEs ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS CARRY THE
RIGHT OF CASH SURRENDER VALUE?-A was insured under an endowment
policy providing (inter alia) for payment on his decease to his children,
and that he or his assigns might surrender the policy at any time during
its term at a scheduled cash value. A assigned for the benefit of his creditors all his property except that exempt by law from execution, whereupon
the assignee brought a bill to determine his rights. Held, that the right of
surrender is a valuable property right which passed by the terms of assignment. Blinn v. Dame, 93 N. E. 6oi (Mass., 1911).
As a general rule, if no phraseology in the policy indicates a different
intent, the right of the beneficiary becomes vested absolutely as soon as the
). Contra, Breitung's
contract is made. Glanz v. Gloeckler, 104 Ill. 573 (
Est., 78 Wis. 33 (1890). But, obviously, a provision enabling the insured to
change beneficiaries gives them only a conditional interest. Martin v. Stubbings, 126 Ill. 387 (1888); and it would appear that, in the principal case,
the children's interest was contingent on the death of the insured before
the expiration of the policy, on their surviving him, and on the non-surrender
of the policy.
The courts are uniform in holding that an option to accept a cash surrender value is property and passes to the trustee in bankruptcy. In re
Slinghuff, io6 Fed. 54 (19o); Hiscock v. Mertens, 2o5 U. S. 2o2 (9o6).
And certainly the position of an assignee is analogous to that of a trustee.
Moreover, "it is a novel idea that a man may have insurance which he may
collect and use if he remains solvent, but that if he becomes insolvent his
creditors cannot reach it. * * * There is no reason that money payable
by an insurance company should stand differently from money payable under
other engagements or settlements." Hobson, J., dissenting in McCutcheon
v. Townsend, IO5 S. W. 937 (Ky., 19o7).
It is commonly argued, "that it is such a laudable thing for a person
when solvent to make secure provision for the future necessities and comfort of those who are naturally and properly dependent upon him, that, upon
his insolvency, the courts -will not thwart his well laid plans. McCutcheon
v. Townsend (supra). In line with this thought, many jurisdictions have,
by statute, exempted from the claims of creditors insurance policies taken
out for the benefit of dependent relatives. See Pa. Act of Assembly, x868,
P. L. 103. But this argument is not applicable tQ the principal case, inasmuch
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as the children's interest was contingent on three different events, on the
happening of which the proceeds would go to A or his estate, it might be
said that the policy was taken out as much for A's benefit as for his beneficiaries. A fair construction to place on the insured's intent is, that he
intended the children to benefit only providing he did not have need for
the money. This construction certainly justifies the decision, and is supported by authorities as shown.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-INDEMNITY

FOR NEGLIGENCE IN PERMITED

DiscHARGE OF FIREWORS.-A municipality, by resolution of the Board of
Aldermen, temporarily suspended city ordinances forbidding discharge of
fireworks in the city, in so far as they related to meetings and parades of
political parties in a specific campaign. Certain fireworks, which were about
to be exhibited in a street in the centre of the city by such a political party,
were accidentally discharged, injuring a bystander. The injured party recovered damages in a suit against the municipality. Held: The latter may
recover over from the person in charge of thd exhibition. City of New York
v. Hearst, 126 N. Y. S. 917 (App. Div., i91i).
While admitting, as was held in Landau v. City of New York, i8o
N. Y. 48 (72 N. E. 631), that the suspension of the ordinance was in fact
a granting of a license to hold the exhibitions in question, the court hold
that the city was not in pari delicto with defendant, because what was
licensed was not a nuisance per se, but an act, which, if improperly done,
might be a nuisance, but, if properly done, would be no nuisance at all.
Melker v. City of New York, i9O N. Y. 485. The fact that the deceased's
administrator recovered from the city did not necessarily mean that it was
a principal in the act, except as to the deceased. The court admit the
doctrine, established in Merryweather v. Nixon, 8 Term Reports, i86, that
there cannot be contribution between joint tortfeasors; but they contend
that in this case the city and Hearst do not stand in such a relation. Mulch
the same principle, though on different facts, was likewise adopted by the
Connecticut court in the case of The Town of Waterbury v. The Waterbury Traction Co., 74 Conn. x52, where it was decided that a municipality,
which had been forced to pay damages to a person injured by a defective
highway, due to the traction company's taking down, and failing to replace,
a railing by the roadside, could recover from the company the amount paid
as damages in the previous suit. It will be seen, however, that a slight
variation of the principle involved by the facts will lead to a contrary decision. In Village of Geneva v. Brush Electric Co., 3 N. Y. Supp. 595, Supr.
Ct., it was held that a municipality could not recover over from an electric
company damages which it had been forced to pay to one injured by the
falling of a pole belonging to the company, but which had been erected by
the company's assignor, and left standing with the consent of the municipality. In the suit by the injured person against the municipality the pole,
as located, was found to be a nuisance. The explanation of this decision,
according to the court in the 'present case, is: "There the vilage was
an active participant in the erection and maintenance of the pole in the position in which it was placed, and the fact that it was placed there of itself
made it an unlawful obstruction." The report of the case does not bear
out the first statement, and the true ground of distinction seems rather to
be, as suggested by the court in that case, that the electric company did
no affirmative act toward placing the pole in its position, and had made
no use of it.
The general exception to the doctrine laid down in Merryweather v.
Nixon, supra, is shown in Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218.
Here a traveler, while passing over a bridge maintainable by the two counties, was injured by its breaking down. He recovered from one of the
counties, and that one in turn recovered contribution from the other, the
court holding that the rule that there cannot be contribution between wrongdoers, does not apply where the plaintiff cannot be presumed to have known
that he was doing an unlawful act.

